| Habermas challenged positivistically minded | | | | with greater precision and inter subjective |
| philosophers of science who explicitly or implicitly | | | | reliability. According to Habermas the objective |
| presupposed that the empirical analytical sciences | | | | reality is just another name for that |
| provide the model for all legitimate knowledge and | | | | intersubjectively agreed upon the set of |
| dismissed all other claim to knowledge as pseudo | | | | properties and relationships that reflects on e |
| knowledge. Habermas distinguished three non | | | | possible way of interpreting nature. Pursuing the |
| reducible quasi transcendental cognitive interests. | | | | penetrating the line of inquiry pioneered by Charles |
| They are the technical, the practical, and the | | | | Pierce, Habermas argues that scientific method, |
| emancipatory. Each of these cognitive interests is | | | | understood asa procedure for attaining a progress |
| itself rooted in historical rationalization. "The overall | | | | since consensus about reality ultimately derives |
| task of critical theory is therefore to disclose | | | | its validity from the natural trial and error revision |
| those interests which lie behind the carious | | | | of belief that accompanies the success or failure |
| exercises of Knowledge in a dimension of human | | | | of adaptive behaviour. Habermas ties objectifying |
| existence. The approach to empirical-analytic | | | | technology and science to human nature. He |
| sciences incorporates a technical cognitive interest, | | | | notes that technological development is a self |
| that of the historical- hermeneutic sciences | | | | objectification of the subject's natural powers. |
| incorporate a practical one, and the approach of | | | | Habermas maintains that once the instrumental |
| critically oriented sciences incorporates the | | | | activity is necessary for survival is institutionalized |
| emancipatory cognitive interest".1 | | | | under the aspect of science, it becomes a social |
| For Habermas, there is no philosophy that is | | | | learning process. This social learning process is |
| above critique. There exists no transcendental | | | | mediated by a different kind of activity known as |
| plane of timeless certitude, no place where a | | | | communication. |
| disinterested consciousness could detach in itself | | | | Understanding is for Gadamer inextricably bound |
| from all historical and ideological concerns and | | | | up with interpretation. He believes that the |
| thereby lay claim to some absolute of knowledge. | | | | interpreter does not approach his subject with |
| All theories and particularly those which present | | | | neutral mind. He brings with him a certain horizon |
| themselves as perfectly neutral and objective are | | | | of expectations, beliefs, concept and norms. He |
| ideologies concealing their own vested interests by | | | | sees the subject from perspectives opened by |
| dressing them up in the guise. There exists, | | | | this horizon. According to Gadamer, all interpretive |
| Habermas argues, pluralism of interests. He groups | | | | understanding is necessarily bound to be |
| them under the above mentioned three | | | | preconceived and prejudged. But openness can |
| categories. | | | | only help the interpreter gradually to become |
| The instrumental interest is the perspective which | | | | aware of his own structure of prejudices in the |
| motivates the allegedly neutral empirical-analytic | | | | course of his interpretative activity. In Gadamer's |
| sciences. This perspective limits the meaning of | | | | view, a successful interpretation entails a fusion |
| empirical facts whose validity depends, in turn, on | | | | of horizons. But this does not mean that there is |
| their technical exploitability within a utilitarian | | | | such a thing as the correct interpretation. Unless |
| system of behaviour. The criterion invoked here | | | | there is an end to history, there can be no end |
| is that purposive rational action. It is epitomized in | | | | to the interpretative process. |
| the contemporary ideology of scientific | | | | To Gadamer, language and tradition are |
| technology. Habermas defines it as the cognitive | | | | inseparable. Tradition is the medium in which |
| interest in technical control over objectified | | | | language is transmitted and developed. Gadamer |
| processes. It is otherwise know as positivism. | | | | criticizes Dilthey by arguing that Dilthey commits |
| This is the type of scientific knowledge that logical | | | | objectivistic fallacy by presuming that the meaning |
| positivists, logical empiricists, and philosophers of | | | | disclosed by correct interpretation is identical with |
| science in the analytic tradition were primarily | | | | the meaning originally intended by the author. |
| interested in ‘analyzing'. | | | | "Gadamer's primary aim was to discredit the |
| Habermas was not degenerating or criticizing | | | | empathetic model of understanding deriving from |
| these forms of knowledge. His point is that it is | | | | romantic tradition of Schleiermacher, Ranke and |
| only one type of knowledge; it is not to be taken | | | | Dilthey".1 Although this tradition had started out as |
| the canonical standard for all forms of knowledge. | | | | a reaction against the Enlightenment, it discarded |
| This is why Habermas challenged positivistically | | | | neither the subject- object dualism nor the |
| minded philosophers of science who explicitly or | | | | methodological glorification of value freedom that |
| implicitly presupposed that the empirical-analytical | | | | were its Cartesian trademarks. |
| sciences provide the model for all legitimate | | | | "By demonstrating that all forms of knowledge |
| knowledge and dismissed all other claims to | | | | and experience are interpretative in the deepest |
| knowledge as pseudo knowledge. | | | | sense, Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics |
| The second category of interest, the practical, | | | | undercuts the shibboleth of value neutrality and |
| favours a model of communicative action. | | | | presuppositionlessness that lives at the center |
| Practical interest- refers to a field of inter | | | | positivism. Science does not mirror reality. It |
| subjective action. For Habermas, this is the | | | | interprets it as a measurable spatio- temporal field |
| domain of the ‘historical hermeneutic sciences'. | | | | of matter and energy in accordance with its own |
| The Historical-Hermeneutic disciplines are governed | | | | methodological assumptions"2. Habermas is in |
| by a practical interest of furthering understanding. | | | | agreement here. H e also sees Gadamer's |
| ‘The historical hermeneutic sciences gain | | | | critique of romantic hermeneutics as explaining |
| knowledge in a different methodological frame | | | | why deep ethical currents run through the human |
| work. Here the meaning of the validity of | | | | science. |
| propositions is not constituted in the frame of | | | | "Every successful understanding applies new |
| reference of technological control…..Access to | | | | meaning to the current situation of the |
| the facts is provided by the understanding of | | | | interpreter, thereby revealing new possibilities for |
| meaning.. The verification of law like hypothesis in | | | | action"3. Habermas praises |
| the empirical analytic science has its counter part | | | | Gadamer'sunderstanding of the way in which ideal |
| in the interpretations of texts. Thus the rules of | | | | structures are generated within the historical |
| hermeneutics determine the possible meaning of | | | | process. He claims that Gadamer regards the |
| the validity of statements of the cultural science.' | | | | interpreter as an actual participant in practical |
| The Historical-Hermeneutic sciences endeavour to | | | | conversation. |
| understand the inherently human dimension of | | | | According to Gadamer, understanding serves to |
| meaning achieved through the interpretation of | | | | bridge the cultural horizons of interpreter and |
| messaged exchanged in everyday language. | | | | author by means of a shared public language. The |
| Habermas believes that Marx recognized a | | | | process of understanding is the mutual |
| distinction between technical and practical interests | | | | understanding between different cultural horizons. |
| when he separated the relations of production and | | | | To Gadamer, any moral relationship requires this |
| the forces of production. The critique of ideology | | | | bridging of cultures. The agreement between |
| depends upon recognition of the split between the | | | | communicating horizons is clarified by Gadamer in |
| technical-analytic interest and the | | | | terms of the dialogical dynamics of textual |
| practical-communicative interest. In making this | | | | understanding. The objectivity of textual |
| critical difference between the interests of | | | | interpretation is achieved by checking the |
| technical control and practical communication, | | | | distorting effects of one's prejudices. Gadamer |
| Habermas endeavours to restore the possibility of | | | | holds that it is futile to attempt to cancel the |
| genuine critical theory. | | | | influence of values, preferences, and linguistic |
| Although Habermas has appropriated the insights | | | | assumptions, because, they form the tacit |
| of the hermeneutic tradition, he has been sharply | | | | background of their understanding. This argument |
| critical of its implicit historicism-its hidden form of | | | | leads to the point that the textual meaning is not |
| positivism. ‘One of the Habermas' most basic | | | | pregiven by the author' original intentions, but |
| and challenging thesis is that we cannot even | | | | partially constituted by the subjectivity of the |
| make sense of the concepts of meaning, | | | | interpreter. But this argument would lead to the |
| understanding, and interpretation unless we | | | | position that textual interpretation is an act of |
| rationally evaluate the validity claims that are | | | | arbitrarily projecting one's own prejudices onto |
| made by participants in these forms of life.' | | | | the text. If thesewere the case, there would be |
| The third category of interest of Habermas is the | | | | no difference between correct and incorrect |
| interest in emancipation of critical reflection. | | | | interpretation. Hence, it would be very difficult to |
| Habermas identifies this with the project of critical | | | | establish that the understanding could serve the |
| social science modeled on the Critical Theory of | | | | function of moral enlightenment. Here, there is a |
| the Frankfurt School and Institute for Social | | | | need for conceiving the textual interpretation |
| Research. The Critical Social Sciences dispel the | | | | along with the model of simulated communication. |
| positivist illusion of disinterestedness and unmask | | | | The objectivity and moral enlightenment can be |
| the ideological interests at work. A critical social | | | | accounted for only by merging the dialogue along |
| science is a dialectical synthesis of the empirical | | | | with textual interpretation. Moral knowledge and its |
| analytic and historical hermeneutical disciplines. It | | | | limitation, like objective interpretation and its |
| goes beyond the one-sided approaches. If a | | | | understanding, involve a process of critical |
| reflection is made on the forms of knowledge and | | | | reflection that can be provoked and sustained |
| the disciplines guided by the technical and practical | | | | only dialogically in communication with self and |
| interests, it could be realized that they contain an | | | | other"4. |
| internal demand for open free, non-coercive | | | | In Habermas's view, the most provocative |
| communication. Habermas argues that it is only by | | | | feature of Gadamer's hermeneutics is the claim |
| exposing this conflict between practical and | | | | against historicism and by implication against |
| technical interest, we can become aware of the | | | | phenomenology and linguistic analysis. The interest |
| third and ultimately most positive form of | | | | behind hermeneutic is an interest in dialogue with |
| cognitive interest,- the interest in emancipation as | | | | others, with the past and with the alien cultures |
| a basic human need for autonomy, responsibility | | | | about the common concerns of human life. The |
| and justice. | | | | hermeneutic orientation is not that of the neutral |
| The idea of critical interest takes us to the center | | | | observation but that of the partner in dialogue. |
| of Habermas' thought. The critical sciences obey | | | | Habermas is of the opinion that the reflection can |
| an emancipatory cognitive interest which insists on | | | | no longer be conceived as absolute. It is always |
| self reflection. In doing so, it seeks liberation from | | | | rooted in the contingent complex of tradition. |
| the constraints of ignorance. Here cognition is not | | | | "Although he accepts Gadamer's point about the |
| for the sake of something else. Cognitive | | | | finitude and context bounded ness of human |
| knowledge operates for its own sake. Habermas | | | | understanding, Habermas rejects his relativistic |
| will argue that the very reflection which links | | | | and idealistic conclusions regarding the logic of |
| knowledge to emancipation reveals the interest | | | | verstehen. In the first place, hermeneutic |
| base of knowledge as such. It combines theory | | | | interpretation must be conjoined with the critique |
| and practice in its very method. To argue that | | | | of ideology"5. |
| knowledge is grounded in practical interests runs | | | | The critique of ideology requires a system |
| contrary to positivist philosophy of science. By | | | | reference that goes beyond tradition by |
| ‘positivism', Habermas means the philosophical | | | | systematically taking into account the empirical |
| movement initiated by August Comte and later | | | | conditions under which it develops and changes. |
| continued by the Vienna School under the name | | | | Hence hermeneutic understanding must be |
| "logical positivism". Positivism maintains that all | | | | conjoined with the analysis of social systems. If |
| forms of knowledge conform to the kind of | | | | social theory is to investigate the conditions under |
| knowledge advocated by the natural science. The | | | | which patterns of interpretation and of action |
| knowledge involves the causal explanation of | | | | develop and change, it will, Habermas maintains, |
| events. Habermas calls this knowledge as | | | | have to be historically oriented, Hence |
| scientism. ‘Positivism assumes that the truth | | | | hermeneutic inquiry must also be conjoined with a |
| of a scientific fact consists in correspondence with | | | | philosophy of history. Actually Habermas is not |
| a reality whose meaning preexists the selective | | | | just after simply an aggregate of several useful |
| perception and conceptual activity of the | | | | approaches but an integrated frame work for |
| perceiver. That is, it is assumed to be freed | | | | social theory. |
| from all practical values and interests that might | | | | Gadamer does not simply plead the advantages |
| lend it a subjective, interpretative cast.' | | | | of tradition; but argues that participation in a |
| Habermas observes that there is no scope for | | | | cultural heritage is a condition of possibility of all |
| subjectivity of the individual in positivism. Natural | | | | thought, including critical reflection. Thus in his reply |
| science understands knowledge in terms of causal | | | | to Habermas, he accuses him of employing an |
| explanations. It will explain any phenomenon in | | | | oversimplified concept of critique and of setting up |
| terms of causal law. This is not accepted by | | | | an abstract opposition between tradition and |
| Habermas. The causal law is established by factual | | | | reflection. Gadamer concludes that Habermas's |
| observation. For example, the gravitation should | | | | critique is dogmatic. Gadamer denies that |
| be established by factual observation of falling of | | | | hermeneutics can be simply opposed to critical |
| thing from the top when they are thrown up. | | | | reflection as the renewal of traditional authority is |
| Natural science which is the strong root of | | | | opposed to its dissolution. He claims reflection is an |
| positivism believes that facts are objective. | | | | integral moment of the attempt to understand. |
| The objectivity of natural science is questioned by | | | | Reflection, according to Gadamer, is not |
| Immanuel Kant. Actually objectivity is another | | | | something opposed to understanding. So, he says |
| word for inter-subjectivity. Inter-subjectivity | | | | that Habermas makes a dogmatic confusion by |
| approach is imbibed in the objectivity. But natural | | | | separating them. |
| science avoids this inter-subjective element. Hence | | | | Gadamer criticizes Habermas on the count that he |
| this point is being criticized by Habermas. | | | | attributes false power to reflection. He claims that |
| The repeatability in natural science is questioned | | | | reflection is always limited, partial, and based on |
| by Habermas. Habermas argues that the entire | | | | taken- for granted preconceptions and |
| outlook of natural sciences is not giving | | | | prejudgments. Habermas wants to get behind |
| importance to active dynamic role of human. | | | | language to the real conditions under which it |
| Further positivism claims to be value neutral. The | | | | historically develops. But, Gadamer views language |
| moral freedom of the individual is deleted by | | | | as not simply one aspect of society among |
| natural science. But Habermas says that there | | | | others. According to Gadamer, it is the universal |
| could be no such theory as value neutral in any | | | | medium of social life. In particular, labour and |
| enterprise. If there is one value neutral theory, | | | | power are located outside of language but |
| human beings can not take it. Habermas brings in | | | | mediated through it. Gadamer is of the view that |
| here the transcendental and anthropological | | | | Habermas makes excessive claims on behalf of |
| argument. He says that knowledge is conducive | | | | critical reflection. "The critic cannot pretend to be |
| to values and values are necessary for self | | | | in sole possession of the truth. His ideas of the |
| preservation. But by and large there is a survival | | | | just life are not exempt from revision and |
| interest. But it should not be taken in the selfish | | | | rejection in dialogue with others. Thus critical |
| sense. It is not that Habermas thinks in terms of | | | | self-reflection, as well as the critique of ideological |
| survival interest, but it predominates. To justify | | | | distortion, cannot be pursued in isolation from the |
| this, he gave this anthropological view. | | | | attempt to come to an understanding with others. |
| His anthropological view holds that there is a need | | | | The ideals of reason are inherently bound up with |
| for life preservation which also leads to | | | | openness to dialogue- both actual dialogue with |
| emancipation of freedom of human individuals. But | | | | contemporaries and virtual dialogue with the |
| on the other hand, Habermas views that it is not | | | | past"6. But Habermas questions the |
| possible to throw away the pursuit of scientific | | | | methodological point of view of Gadamer. He asks |
| knowledge. So he wanted the knowledge which is | | | | the questionwhether hermeneutics is or can be |
| technically useful and morally binding, not only | | | | the sole and adequate basis of social inquiry. |
| morally binding but also morally liberating. So | | | | Habermas feels that by absolutizing or by way to |
| Habermas believes that positivism is false as | | | | ontologising of hermeneutics, it results in an |
| philosophical theory about the essential structure | | | | aprioristic devaluation of the methods of social |
| of cognition. It neglects the fundamentally | | | | analysis with a theoretical basis that goes beyond |
| interested nature of all knowledge. Habermas | | | | the normal linguistic competence. |
| thinks that positivism gives a false account of | | | | Though Habermas does not deny the intimate |
| scientific methodology. Habermas insists that a | | | | connection between critical reflection and |
| critical social science guided by an emancipatory | | | | hermeneutic understanding, he differs on the |
| interest is necessary for guaranteeing the | | | | proper approach to tradition. "Habermas's counter |
| objectivity. | | | | position is an attempt to mitigate the radically |
| Habermas in his ‘Knowledge and Human | | | | situational character of understanding through the |
| Interest' traces back to the prehistory of | | | | introduction of theoretical elements; the |
| positivism. In doing that job, he analyses the | | | | communication and social evolution are meant to |
| tradition of German philosophy from Kant through | | | | reduce the context dependency of the basic |
| Hegel and Marx. By analyzing this, he tries to | | | | categories and assumptions of critical theory"7. |
| justify that a critique of knowledge must aspire | | | | The important influence of hermeneutics in |
| to social critique. Actually Habermas has not totally | | | | Habermas's work nowhere more visible than in |
| rejected the positivist philosophy. He felt that the | | | | the ‘linguistic turn' of his later work. |
| path of reflection leading from Kant to Hegel and | | | | "Habermas agrees with Gadamer that language is |
| Marx was not entirely suppressed by the | | | | not only an object in our hands, it is the reservoir |
| positivist philosophy of science. In his | | | | of traditions in and through which we exist"8. |
| ‘Knowledge and Human Interest' Habermas | | | | Socialization and cultural reproduction go through |
| had touched upon fundamental issues that | | | | the medium of language. Ego – identity is |
| preoccupied thinkers in a variety of fields. He had | | | | formed and reciprocally stabilized in linguistic |
| advanced a provocative interpretation of | | | | interaction. Social action is typically accomplished |
| movement of though that encompassed Kant, | | | | coordinated through ordinary speech. It is for |
| Fichte, Hegel, Marx, Dilthey, Peirce, Nietzsche, | | | | these reasons that Habermas has taken on the |
| Comte and Freud. | | | | colossal task of transposing his social theory into |
| In this context, it is worth of observing what | | | | the paradigm of linguistic communication. |
| Charles Pierce has said. He provides an important | | | | "Habermas agrees that it makes good sense to |
| link between Marx and Hegel. The Kantian notion | | | | conceive of language as a kind of meta-institution |
| of reason was transformed by Marx and Hegel | | | | on which all social institutions are dependent; for |
| from synthetic activity to social activity. For Kant, | | | | social action is constituted only in ordinary |
| the synthetic power of the mind produces causal | | | | communication"9.Yet hermeneutics dies, not go |
| unity in the world. Pierce shows how the | | | | far enough; it is insufficiently objective. By |
| production of a causally unified world becomes the | | | | entering social reality only through the mutuality of |
| function of labour. It is the instrumental action. He | | | | understanding hermeneutics comes up against the |
| argues that the discovery of causal regularities | | | | walls of tradition from the inside as it were. The |
| occurs only in the course of instrumental | | | | problem is that language is also a medium of |
| interventions in nature. Passive observations alone | | | | power and oppression; language has an ideological |
| do not help to differentiate the non causal | | | | dimension. This could be observed even in family |
| connections from the causal connections. For | | | | relations and political culture. Power relations, |
| Pierce, the experimental behaviour is necessary | | | | Habermas observes, come upon as a |
| for the discovery of causal connections This | | | | systematically distorted communication. According |
| forms the basic logic underlying the scientific | | | | to Habermas, a critical theory of society must |
| enquiry. | | | | therefore also provide objective explanations of |
| "The logic of scientific inquiry consists of three | | | | social reality that come so to speak, from the |
| types of instrumental activity. They are: discovery | | | | outside in. Habermas views that the problem with |
| of causal laws via trial and error (abduction), | | | | hermeneutics is that it affirms the rights of |
| explanation, or inference of effects from | | | | tradition at the expense of reflection, at the |
| antecedent conditions and causal laws(deductions) | | | | expense of potentially emancipatory reflection |
| and experimental confirmation of laws(induction)" | | | | that proves itself. |
| * | | | | Notes: |
| These three types of instrumental activities | | | | 1. Gadamer. H.G., Truth and Method, New York, |
| comprise a methodologically sophisticated set of | | | | 1975, p.124. |
| operations. This leads to the possibility of the | | | | 2. David Ingram, Habermas and the Dialectic of |
| acquisition of causal knowledge. The instrumental | | | | Reason, Yale University Press, London, p.9. |
| activities-abduction, deduction, induction, | | | | 3. Ibid, p.9. |
| corresponds to primitive behaviours which evolved | | | | 4. Ibid, p.24. |
| in response to organic changes in the species. | | | | 5. Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of |
| Habermas understands that the scientific method | | | | Jurgen Habermas, MIT Press, USA,1989,p.182. |
| transforms feedback monitored behaviour into a | | | | 6. Ibid, p.190. |
| cumulative learning process by isolating causal | | | | 7. Ibid, p.193. |
| chains under controlled conditions. To him, | | | | 8. Gadamer.H.G., On the Scope and Function of |
| measuring procedures infuse instrumental actions | | | | Hermeneutic Reflection, 1970, p.360. |